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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to determine evacuation decisions of residents in Pinellas
County, a vulnerable area in Florida, during Hurricane Irma in 2017, and whether those decisions
will impact their future decisions to evacuate. This study also examines the resident’s perception
of storm surge flooding during a hurricane. To understand evacuation decisions and storm surge
perceptions a survey was conducted on residents in vulnerable areas of Pinellas County. The
survey examined multiple aspects including the role of media, relationships, and
sociodemographic status on decision making. Another aspect examined if their decision to
evacuate for Hurricane Irma will impact their decision for the future. Residents were also asked
to rate how different aspects of the storm influenced their decision, including flooding from
storm surge. It was concluded that their decision to evacuate for Hurricane Irma will
significantly impact their decision to evacuate for the next hurricane, with many residents
claiming they would leave their local area. Storm surge was not perceived as the greatest threat,
instead wind speed and size of storm were determined to be the greater threat. Better
understanding of evacuation decisions and perceptions about storm surge can be used to update
emergency management preparations and planning for the next hurricane..
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

It is no secret that the west coast of Florida, in particular the Tampa area, is vulnerable in the
event of a direct impact from a hurricane. Three of these vulnerable counties, shown in figure 1,
adjacent to Tampa Bay include: Pinellas County with the cities of St. Petersburg and Clearwater
to the West, Hillsborough County with the city of Tampa to the East, and Manatee County with
the city of Bradenton to the south. Recently, a study prepared by a risk management company,
ranked Tampa, Florida #1 for the country’s most vulnerable city to storm surge (Clark 2015)
where storm surge “is the abnormal rise in seawater level during a storm, measured as the
height of the water above the normal predicted astronomical tide” (NOAA). There are numerous
research papers that focus on the Tampa area, but the research for this study will focus just west
and a little south of the Tampa area, in Pinellas County one of the most populous counties in
Florida.
Storm surge is not the only risk this area of Florida faces in the event of a major hurricane.
Also associated with major hurricanes would be high winds, flooding from rainfall, tornadoes,
issues with evacuation and hazards after the storm, including flooded roads, downed power lines,
unsafe generator operation, and hazardous debris. This research will examine the population of
Pinellas County and their perceptions about evacuation, including reasons to evacuate or not,
what influences their decisions, and if storm surge is perceived as a threat. Using Hurricane Irma
as a case study, this research will also examine if their decision to evacuate for Hurricane
1

Irma will impact their decision to evacuate for future storms. First there will be a discussion of
research of past Florida hurricanes including, past hurricanes to impact the Pinellas area, storm
surge, vulnerability, and evacuations that have taken place in other areas and in Pinellas County.
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Figure 1. Map of counties around Tampa Bay (GIS)

Understanding residents’ evacuation decisions and perception of storm surge could help
create better communication and education for the citizens in this area including the importance
on preparing their homes and heeding evacuation orders in the event of a major storm which
could ultimately save lives.

1.1 History of Florida Hurricanes
Florida has a long, eventful past experiencing hurricanes that have moved through the
state leaving behind damage and destruction. Figure 2. may resemble a haphazard scribbling,
2

but in fact shows the tracks of hurricanes from the past 100 years that have impacted Florida.
Some of the most notable storms to make their way through the peninsula include, Donna,
Andrew, Charley, Jeanne, Frances, Irma, and most recently Michael and many more, many from
the time before storms were named. More information on Florida’s historical hurricanes can be
found in Collins et al. (2017).
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Figure 2. Hurricane tracks from the past 100 years. (NOAA)

1.1.1 Hurricane Andrew
When the topic of past hurricanes in Florida arises, most people will recall Hurricane
Andrew which cut across south Florida in August of 1992 as a category 5 storm. The sustained
winds were recorded at 165 mph, the storm surge measured to be more than 4 meters (13ft)
(Baker 1993). Hurricane Andrew is listed as the seventh costliest natural disaster for the United
States as of 2017 (NHC 2018). The total cost of damages associated with the storm were
estimated to be $48.1 billion (Blake et al. 2011). According to the official storm report Hurricane
Andrew devasted much of Miami-Dade County in Florida. The assessment after the storm
concluded that 137,000 homes were destroyed, 9,000 of those being mobile homes.
3

This left at least 160,000 people homeless in Dade County alone. Power grids were destroyed,
roads were washed away, businesses left in ruin. Even though the physical damage was
immense, fatalities were few. The deaths in Florida, directly related to the storm, equaled 15 with
another 29 caused indirectly from the storm (Baker 1993).
Hurricane Andrew would prove to be the proverbial eye opener to the possible
destruction a major storm could cause coastal cities. Hurricane Andrew would also demonstrate
the necessity to have more accurate forecast systems and methods. Andrew proved the need to
improve building codes, evacuation methods, preparedness. Andrew changed the way Floridians
would prepare for a major storm.
1.1.2 2004 Hurricane Season
The infamous 2004 hurricane season would prove to be a test for the building codes put
in place after Hurricane Andrew. An unprecedented four storms crisscrossed the state in a matter
of two months. Figure 3 shows where three of the storms intersected the state and the other
impacted the panhandle. The estimated losses because of these storms, exceeded $42 billion,
about one in five homes in Florida experienced hurricane damage, blue roofs were a common
sight in Florida for months after the storms, and 117 people were killed (NCDC 2004).
Sallenger et al. (2006) compared the level of coastal change that occurred during these
storms using lidar surveys performed before and after the storms. Sallenger noted that each storm
had a different effect on the coast, which could not simply be explained by the hurricane
intensity defined by the Saffir-Simpson Scale. Interestingly, Hurricane Charley, the strongest of
the four storms, had the least amount of shoreline change.
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Figure 3. Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne 2004. (NOAA)

Even though very intense, Hurricane Charley was a very compact storm that moved
through the state rapidly, decreasing the effect of storm surge erosion. Figure 4 shows North
Captiva Island before Hurricane Charley and after Hurricane Charley. The image shows the
barrier island eroded into two sections. Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne impacted the same coast
within weeks of each other. The slow moving, Hurricane Frances occurred before Jeanne and
removed much of the sand and sand dunes that would protect against erosion, allowing Jeanne to
further erode the shorelines in this area (Sallenger et al. 2006).
Hurricane Ivan would prove to have the most coastal erosion out of the four Florida
hurricanes. Ivan is noted to have caused the collapse of a large oceanfront five-story building in
Alabama which was built on a large sand dune.

5

Figure 4. before and after North Captiva Island 2004 (USGS)

The failure of this structure demonstrated the issues with building on barrier islands.
During Ivan, many other barrier islands were completely over washed, pushing sand and debris
into the back bay. An average of 20-meter shoreline retreat occurred because of Ivan along the
Alabama and Florida panhandle shores (Sallenger et al. 2006).
This study by Sallenger et al. (2006) provided detailed information about coastal erosion
during the 2004 hurricane season. The data gathered from the 2004 hurricane season helped
develop new ways to scale and predict coastal change that occurs during hurricanes. This
information could be important to companies or residents planning build in areas that could be
affected by shore erosion during a tropical cyclone. Stronger foundations and improved building
codes for these structures is a necessity.

6

1.1.3 Most Recent Hurricanes
After the 2004 hurricane season, Florida stayed out of the path of hurricanes. In 2016
there was a close call with Hurricane Matthew, the first category 5 hurricane in the Atlantic since
2007. At one point the track for Hurricane Matthew was set to directly hit the Florida East Coast.
Most counties along the east coast were under mandatory and voluntary evacuation. Luckily,
Hurricane Matthew stayed just off the coast of Florida as a quickly weakening category 4, but
still left millions without power and created a damaging storm surge, the highest levels of 2.12
meters (6.96ft) in Fernandina Beach. Inundation was also measured further inland along the St.
Johns River. Two deaths in Florida were directly related to Hurricane Matthew. Structural
damage due to winds was said to be minimal, more damage was caused by storm surge flooding
(Stewart 2017).
In 2017, Florida was in the pathway of Hurricane Irma. The track, changing multiple
times, first with the east coast in danger, and shifting more west with every update. In the end the
category 4 storm made landfall first in Cudjoe Key, part of the Florida Keys, and a second
landfall as a category 3 near Marco Island. Hurricane Irma moved northward through the
Peninsula passing as a category 1 between Tampa and Orlando. Though weakening as it moved
through Florida, the tropical storm force winds extended up to 360 miles from the center,
impacting most of Florida. In southwest Florida the storm surge levels were reported to be
between 2-3 meters (6-10ft). Though Irma made landfall on the west coast of Florida, the east
coast also experienced storm surge flooding and wind damage. Seven deaths were directly
related to Hurricane Irma in Florida alone. The storm was responsible for an estimated $50
billion in damage (Cangialois et al. 2018).

7

The most recent hurricane to make landfall in the Florida panhandle, demonstrated the
power and destruction that accompanies a major hurricane. Making landfall on October 10th,
2018 as a strong category 4 storm, with sustained winds of 155 mph and a storm surge over 4.6
meters (14ft), Hurricane Michael is considered the fourth strongest hurricane, in regard to
windspeed, to make landfall in the United States (NOAA 2018). Though, still not concluded, at
least 60 fatalities were caused by Hurricane Michael in Florida along the path.
1.2 History of Hurricanes to Directly Impact Pinellas County
Even though Florida has had its share of hurricane activity, Pinellas County has been
very fortunate when it comes to direct hurricane hits. Referring to figure 5, it shows there have
been several “close calls” to the South Pinellas area. However, this area has only been directly
impacted by two storms since the 1900’s. The first arrived in October of 1921 (letter a in figure
4) and the second in October 1946 (letter b in figure 5).

a

b

012.525

50

75 100
Kilometers

Figure 5. Hurricanes that have impacted Pinellas County (NOAA)

These two storms made landfall in a time before any type of radar or satellite was in use
for hurricane detection. A time before the hurricane hunters could fly in and send back
8

measurements and readings directly from the storm. A time before the internet and social media
could spread the warnings and updates in a blink of an eye. A time before storms were assigned
names. Predicting where the storms would make landfall, and how intense they would be at
landfall was almost an impossible task.
1.2.1 Hurricane of 1921
The unnamed hurricane of 1921, which developed in the west-central Caribbean Sea,
was estimated to be a category 3 storm at its strongest, with winds over 100 mph (Landsea et al.
2011). The exact strength of the storm at landfall is still debated among scientists, since the
instruments used to record the data during the storm were damaged.
According to Edward Bowie (1921), the forecaster on duty for the Weather Bureau in
Washington D.C., hurricane warnings were not issued until the day of landfall for the unnamed
hurricane in Tampa. These warnings were passed down via telephone and telegraph wires, until
the systems for both went down due to the storm. Citizens of the area actually traveled to the
nearest weather office to relay information about the damages and the people assisting those in
need, even while the storm was raging outside (Bowie 1921). They reported people fleeing from
the rising water. According to the same weather review the storm surge was estimated to be 10.5
feet (Bowie 1921). Figure 6 shows the estimated storm surge model simulation for the storm of
1921. Reports submitted to the Weather Bureau included information like Clearwater Beach and
St. Petersburg being completely inundated. A quote in the review read, "I lived on 18th Avenue
North on Beach Drive, and water was 3 to 4 feet deep there," Joseph Dew said. "Water came up
Central Avenue to First Street, and the Gulf beaches were covered." It was reported that Egmont
Key, an island located southwest of the tip of St. Petersburg, and Sanibel Island, located west of.
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Fort Myers, were both completely covered by water (Lonon 2011).

Figure 6. Storm surge model of 1921 storm (NOAA)
Red lines represent county lines
The damage from this storm was extensive, even though at the time the Pinellas and
Hillsborough county areas were not densely populated. The storm was responsible for 8 deaths.
Many buildings and structures were reduced to rubble along the coasts surrounding Tampa Bay.
Figure 7 shows the wreckage in Safety Harbor that was left after the storm (NOAA 2011).
From these images, the magnitude of the storms’ power is clearly visualized. High winds
and storm surge would have contributed to such devastation. The storm surge model created
years after the event show that the flooding due to storm surge was contained along the coastal
10

regions of Pinellas County, luckily sparing most of the peninsula. Downtown Tampa and areas
adjacent to rivers were the most effected.

Figure 7. Wreckage in Safety Harbor Springs (State archives of Florida)

1.2.2 Hurricane of 1946
The last hurricane on record to directly impact Pinellas County was in early October of
1946. According to the weather report, the hurricane lost most of its intensity before making
landfall just south of St. Petersburg. The maximum wind speeds reported were around 75 mph,
and those were recorded in the top right quadrant of the storm, where the most severe winds are
found (Sumner 1946). The reports also indicated that the storm moved through the state, heading
northeast towards Georgia, rapidly.
The citrus crops in Florida sustained the greatest damage. At the time, the damage to the
citrus crop alone equaled $2,000,000. Another estimated $200,000 in damages occurred from
unusually high tides along the west coast. There were reports of flooding along the beaches and
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low lying areas around St. Petersburg and Tampa. Some readings showed that the tides were up
by 6 or more feet in certain areas in Pinellas County (Sumner 1946)
1.3 Storm Surge
For people who live along a coast, the threat of storm surge is a threat that is all too real.
Storm surge is defined by the National Hurricane Center as the abnormal rise of water generated
by a storm, above the predicted tides (NOAA). Storm surge occurs when water is being pushed
by the winds while moving around a cyclone the pressure difference between the center of the
storm and the pressure outside of the storm also accounts for more water being pushed from the
center. These winds and waters are initially pushed ashore when the storm makes landfall,
causing inundation and destructive, powerful waves along coastal regions.

A study by

Rappaport (2014) showed that storm surge accounted for 49% of tropical cyclone related deaths
in the United States spanning a period from 1963-2012. Research on the cause of death for 2,325
people showed that around 90% of deaths occurred in water related incidents, most of those
being drowning (Rappaport 2014).
Storm surge also accounts for a large majority of structural damage that occurs during a
tropical cyclone. Storm surge is responsible for billions of dollars in damage in the United States.
Storm surge poses a threat to buildings, airports, marinas, infrastructure like roads, bridges,
utility grids, sewers, and much more. Figures 8 and 9 show some of the destruction caused by
storm surge along a coastal area. According to the U.S. Census, coastal county populations
around the Gulf increased by 32% between 1990-2008 and continue to increase. Coastal cities
are some of the most populous areas in a given state, which makes them very vulnerable to storm
surge events. A comprehensive study by multiple scientists and stake holders concluded that
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storm surge of about 7 meters could possibly inundate 67% of interstates, 57% of arterials, 29
airports, and almost all ports along the Gulf Coast (Savonis et al. 2008).

Figure 9. A house in North Carolina
toppled by Hurricane Floyd’s 4.5-meter
storm surge 1999 (FEMA)

Figure 8. Beachfront road and boardwalk
damaged by Hurricane Jeanne 2004 (FEMA)

1.3.1 Storm Surge Research
Storm surge associated with tropical cyclones has proven to be one of the costliest and
deadliest natural catastrophes to occur around the world. A study done by climatologists,
Needham and Keim (2011), illustrated the physical processes of storm surge and created an
impact scale. In their research they discuss the fact that understanding the science of storm surge
can be very complex due to the many factors that can affect storm surge, which in turn can make
predicting storm surge very difficult. Their research included quotes from U.S. government
sources, newspapers, and books which they used to create a 4-tier classification system by levels
of destruction. The levels ranged from 1 with minor “marine impacts” to 4 “destructive impacts”.
Interestingly the results in the different levels showed that major hurricanes, like c5 Hurricane
Beulah in 1967 was considered a level 2, while minor storms like category 2 Hurricane Danny in
1997 was considered a level 4 in this classification method. Their research showed that category
alone is not a good estimate of what level storm surge a storm may produce. Many contributing
factors, like the shape of the coastline, how fast the storm is moving, the size of the storm, and
13

bathymetry can affect the level of storm surge (Needham and Keim 2011). This team of
scientists also created the first comprehensive storm surge database called SURGEDAT which
has compiled data from storm surge events all around the world. The database includes
information about the peak height and location for more than 300 surge events in the U.S. dating
back to the 1800’s. Using past information like this compiled in SURGEDAT, can help
forecasters in the future (Needham and Keim 2012).
SLOSH, which stands for Sea Lake Overland Surges from Hurricanes, is a revolutionary
model developed by the National Weather Service to forecast and study storm surge. SLOSH
began as a model intended to be used by the National Weather Service and National Hurricane
Center as a forecast tool while preparing weather bulletins, but has shown to be very useful in
determining coast lines that are vulnerable to storm surge flooding. Figure 10 shows the 38
different SLOSH basins along the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts.
The SLOSH model is run by forecasters when there is a hurricane threatening a coastal
area. The parameters used for the model include: (1) storm position as a function of time, (2) the
radius of maximum winds, and (3) the pressure difference between the central pressure and the
peripheral pressure. Based on the forecast track, the correct basin is used for the model. The
model is most accurate when the storm is within a day or two of making landfall which can
prove problematic regarding evacuation. The SLOSH model is also used for simulation runs to
research how an area could possibly be affected by storm surge given a multitude of various
factors. This information is used by emergency management teams in development of their
evacuation plans for an area (Glahn 2009).
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Figure 10. SLOSH MODEL basins
(NOAA)

Another important study on storm surge was conducted by a group of scientists, Fleming
et al. (2008) that focused their research on real time storm surge forecasting using ADCIRC.
ADCIRC is a system of computer programs for solving time dependent, free surface circulation
and transport problems in two and three dimensions. Their research takes a look at the issues of
forecasting storm surge and they developed an automated real-time storm surge forecasting
system to address the challenges that come with forecasting storm surge. Once created, they
applied the model to a case study to see how the system performed. They used Lake
15

Pontchartrain in Southern Louisiana as their case study, which was an area affected by storm
surge during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Their methods and techniques include creating an
ensemble of five ARDIC storm surge runs based on storm forecasts created by the National
Hurricane Center. The model they created also took into account the following challenges
usually associated with forecasting storm surge; the uncertainties of hurricane forecasts, accurate
wind fields for storm surge computations, timeliness of putting information out there, and
reliability. After applying their model to the case study of Lake Pontchartrain, they concluded
that this system met the performance and reliability goals which included high resolution results
that would pinpoint storm surge at particular infrastructure, a very quick turnaround time from
the issue of an advisory from NHC, and capturing the changes of a developing storm. Their
model service can also be applied to other geographic areas like Pinellas County (Fleming 2008).
1.3.2 Notable storm surge events
Hurricane Katrina, a category 3 storm and one of the costliest and deadliest storms to
impact the United States in August of 2005 (Blake 2011), demonstrated the destruction storm
surge can cause in low lying areas. Surveys performed by FEMA after the storm showed that
515,249 homes in Louisiana were damaged due to storm surge or flooding (Current 2015). The
fatalities in Louisiana are estimated to be 1,577 directly or indirectly related to Hurricane Katrina
(Knabb 2005). One study by Ebersole et al. (2009) focused on the storm surge flooding that
affected the low-lying polder, St. Bernard Parish in Louisiana. Figure 11 shows a satellite image
of the massive size of Hurricane Katrina in comparison to the St. Bernard Parish located in the
red box.
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Figure 11. Satellite image of Hurricane Katrina cloud cover as the storm approaches landfall along the
northern Gulf of Mexico coastline. (Ebersole et al. 2009)

Extreme water levels in this area led to breaches in the levee system, which resulted in
major flooding. In their research Ebersole et al. utilized ARDIC and other model systems to
demonstrate the development and propagation of storm surge created by Hurricane Katrina into
this region. Their study showed that several factors played a role in the surge conditions
including, prevailing regional and local wind conditions and patterns, presence of channels,
presence of wetlands and other topographic features and the orientation and configuration of the
levee system (Ebersole et al. 2009). They also address that a different hurricane striking this
same area would have a different impact. Thus, furthering the idea that storm surge events are
difficult to predict for any given storm due to the complexities of factors that play a role in the
generation of storm surge.
Another notable storm surge event happened when category 2, Hurricane Ike, made
landfall in Galveston Texas in September of 2008. Proving that category alone is not a good
predictor of the damage a hurricane can cause, especially regarding storm surge. Galveston is a
barrier island off the coast of Texas and is no stranger to destructive hurricanes, yet around
17

50,000 people call the island home and many more visit each year to enjoy the beaches. (Quick
2016). Figure 12 shows the storm surge levels as Hurricane Ike made landfall. Some storm surge
levels reached as high as 14-16 feet. Most of the inundation was concentrated in the right
quadrant of the hurricane where the water is being pushed towards the shore due to the flow of
the storm.

Figure 12. Storm surge levels for Hurricane Ike (NOAA)
Figures 13 and 14 show the devastation and flooding caused by Hurricane Ike’s storm
surge. From the pictures it is clear to see the first level of these buildings that were not on stilts
were flooded. Some houses on stilts were damaged very badly or even destroyed.
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Roads were impassable and most likely damaged or washed away. Other infrastructure in the
coastal areas of Texas were also badly damaged including sewer systems, which can create
another set of issues in safety and health.
Other studies (Dolan and Davis 1992; Dolan and Davis 1993; Irish 2008) have
demonstrated that the current Saffir Simpson Scale should be updated. The current scale, which
was developed in 1969 estimates damage based on wind speed alone. However, wind speed is
not always an indicator of storm surge levels, which was shown in the use of the ADCIRC
model. Updating of the Saffir-Simpson scale could lead to fewer fatalities and better planning.

Figures 13 and 14 flooding caused in coastal Texas from Hurricane Ike (National Geographic)

1.3.3 Storm Surge: Pinellas County
A thorough study of the impacts of storm surge to this area of Florida was performed by
Weisberg and Zheng (2006). They created a model to simulate storm surge given parameters
including, size of storm, intensity, direction and speed of the approach, landfall area, pressure
fields, topography of the ocean floor, and other parameters. Their study showed that all of these
factors make a large difference in regards to storm surge levels to this particular area of Florida.
In their study, they ran 11 different scenarios changing these parameters for each. Their research

19

showed that the highest level of storm surge for Pinellas County would occur when a storm is
positioned north of Tampa Bay, so that the maximum winds from the storm are at the mouth of
the bay (Weisberg and Zheng 2006). Figure15 shows a subaerial picture of Pinellas County with
1.5 meters of storm surge and 6 meters of storm surge which could possibly occur if a major
hurricane made landfall at or near Pinellas County. Weisberg and Zheng (2006) ran their worstcase scenario model with a category 4 hurricane, which makes this a scenario where storm surge
would be catastrophic, but not necessarily the “worst” case.

Figure 15. Bathymetric-topographic Tampa Bay demonstration project data set (NOAA-USGS)
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Less storm surge was recorded if the hurricane made landfall further north along the
coast. They also note that storms that approach from the north have greater storm surge than
those approaching from the south. Another discovery was that storms with higher winds, for
example category 4 storms will have a greater storm surge than storms with lower winds. This
research is very important because like Needham and Keim’s (2011) research, it illustrates how a
change in just one of the parameters of the storm can affect a certain area, like Pinellas County.
They also suggested future studies using real time predictions in advance of an actual storm. The
research also recognized the need to develop more accurate coastal weather forecasts to improve
evacuation methods.
Though not focused on Pinellas County, research by Lin and Emanuel discusses the
possibility of ‘grey swan’ storms and their impacts to coastal regions like Tampa in Hillsborough
County. Grey swan tropical cyclones are storms with high impact that would not be predicted
based on past storms alone but may be foreseeable by using physical knowledge along with
historical data (Lin and Emanuel 2016). With the impact of storm surge as the main focal point,
they enlisted multiple climate model simulations coupled with a very large synthetic surge
database to come up with the worst-case scenario for the Tampa area. The results showed the
worst-case scenario for Hillsborough and Pinellas County would be a category 5 storm traveling
south to north and making a right turn, directly over Pinellas County. Figure 16 shows the worst
case- strong category 5 simulated scenario, where the black line represents the path the storm
would take and the resultant storm surge levels reaching 11.1 meters (Lin and Emanuel 2016).
One of the reasons for the extreme storm surge is the fact that waves are trapped along the
continental shelf as the storm travels northward along the coast (Morey et al. 2006). Once the
storm makes landfall the water that was trapped, surges across the Pinellas County peninsula
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from high elevation to lower elevations as seen in Figure 16. This will essentially cut off the
higher areas of Pinellas County from resources and emergency help. Even though these residents
would be spared from flooding from storm surge, they would still face issues when trying to
venture out from their homes.

Figure 16. Worst case scenario model (Lin and Emanuel 2016)

The Tampa Regional Planning Council, along with other stakeholders in the Tampa area
developed a plan in the event of a major hurricane impacting the Tampa area, including Pinellas
County (Tampa 2010). The fictitious category 5 hurricane was given the name Hurricane
Phoenix and the scenario has the hurricane making landfall in Pinellas County. Using SLOSH
and HAZUS-MH models, the team could determine the impacts a storm of this magnitude would
have in an area like Tampa Bay. Figure 17 shows the path of the storm and the storm surge
associated with Hurricane Phoenix. Noticeably, most of Pinellas County is inundated to some
extent.
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Figure 17. Project Phoenix, storm track, and storm surge levels (Tampa Regional Planning Council 2010)

The scenario was used to determine the physical damage, social impacts, and economic
losses that were a direct result from this hypothetical hurricane. The results revealed the
significant amount of damage Hillsborough and Pinellas counties would have. The number of
damaged buildings was most abundant in Pinellas County showing a total of 425,113 with minor
to major damage due to storm surge. The scenario also revealed the number of important
structures throughout that would be affected including hospitals, schools, and emergency
operations. The model also indicated that the airport in St. Petersburg/Clearwater would have
significant flooding from storm surge. The number of entire households that would be displaced
due to damage from storm surge and winds equaled 383,213 in Pinellas County, 42 percent of
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the county’s population. The estimated number of casualties directly related to the storm in
Pinellas County is 889, with another 89 casualties related to post storm issues (Tampa 2010).
1.4 Vulnerability
The idea of what makes an area vulnerable can seem subjective and difficult to quantify
in a study. Yet many studies have been focused on the idea of vulnerability, whether geophysical
or social. The geophysical features can be more defined as the risk to an area while social
systems characterize the vulnerability to an area (Chakraborty 2005). Vulnerability of any type
can lead to devastation, especially if an area has multiple forms of vulnerability, as is the case
with Pinellas County.
1.4.1 Geophysical Vulnerability
The geophysical vulnerability or risk is determined by the number and type of physical
hazards an area is exposed to. These hazards can include events like fires, earthquakes, lightning,
tornadoes, and hurricanes, just to name a few. Tobin and Montz (1997) created a list which
categorized the components of hazards that contribute to geophysical vulnerability. Those
components included: physical mechanism (magnitude, duration, and spatial extent), temporal
distribution (frequency, seasonal patterns), spatial distribution (geographic location), countdown
interval (preparation time, speed of onset). Some of the contributing factors to geophysical
vulnerability in Pinellas County include, low elevation and proximity to large, warm bodies of
water during hurricane season which lasts officially from June 1st to November 30th.
Geophysical vulnerability also includes how properties can be damaged or destroyed.
During a hurricane, damage can be caused by strong winds, flooding due to storm surge or rain,
tornadoes, debris falling, the list goes on. Areas with mobile homes, especially those in flood
zones, are at a high risk to be destroyed not only be high winds, but also storm surge. A study on
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people’s perceptions of geophysical vulnerability was done during the evacuation process for
Hurricane Irma (Senkbeil et al. 2018). Residents at rest stops along their evacuation route were
asked to rank their level of concern about how much damage they would receive back at their
homes. They were also asked about their perception of the wind speed and at what wind speed
damage would occur. This study showed that many people have misperceptions about
windspeeds, even though this factor of a hurricane is of great concern.
One way to determine geophysical vulnerability is to utilize models to determine how a
natural hazard may impact an area. The HAZUS-MH model, which was created by FEMA, is
used to estimate potential losses that can occur from earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tsunamis
(FEMA).
1.4.2 Social Vulnerability
Social vulnerability has been a difficult concept to analyze, mainly because of the many
different factors that could potentially affect an areas social vulnerability. An important study on
social vulnerability conducted by Cutter (2003) broke down the categories that characterize an
areas social vulnerability into eleven main factors. These factors included; personal wealth, age,
density of built environment, single-sector economic dependence, housing stock and tenancy,
race, ethnicity, occupation, and infrastructure dependence. These factors were all combined to
create the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI). An example of Pinellas County’s 2016 (SoVI) map
created by the Center for Disease Control, is represented in figure 18. Where those areas with the
highest vulnerability are shown in dark blue and those with lowest vulnerability is shown in light
yellow.
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Figure 18. 2016 Social Vulnerability Index for Pinellas County (CDC)

In 2013, a study by Zhang (2013) discussed the idea of Social vulnerability as being
described as the characteristics of a community that can influence their ability to prepare, resist,
and then recover from the impacts from a hazard. Though social vulnerability has many
contributing factors, as was discussed from Cutter’s (2003) research, it can be broken into two
parts; human vulnerability and the ability to access resources (Zhang 2013).

The study

performed by Zhang, further expanded the idea of social vulnerability into four categories
including population, career, economic, and infrastructure vulnerabilities. From these four
categories vulnerabilities can be broken down into subcategories, much like Cutter’s (2003)
work, but in the case of Zhang’s research, 26 subcategories were chosen to represent the
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vulnerability of an area. A few of the 26 subcategories chosen for this research included:
population density, household composition, percent unemployed, income, percentage of old
houses, and number of fire stations within a certain distance (Zhang 2013).
The built environment has changed drastically in past few decades, these changes in
population density, social characteristics, and economic conditions, has led to more people living
in highly geophysical vulnerable areas. With the changing social, physical, and economic
structures, it is important to adapt emergency plans throughout time to reflect current
vulnerabilities (Cutter 2008). Hurricane loss modeling historically has not included the social
vulnerability component. However, multiple indices have been created to measure social
vulnerability for an area. Some of them perform better than others as shown in the study done by
Bakkensen, et. al. (2017) which compared five of the most prominent disaster indices used in the
United States. The Social Vulnerability index (SoVI) outperformed the other models for
declaring disasters.. The SoVI, however did not perform as well when explaining damages or
fatalities. This research, solidified the idea that there is no, one, perfect vulnerability index by
which to solely depend, but that each, in its own right, can provide important information and
further the understanding of how social vulnerability is an important component to include in
damage assessments.
A study by Cutter and Emrich (2006), discussed the idea that social vulnerability is not
distributed evenly between social groups or different areas and a common, standard approach to
handling emergency preparations, response, and recovery may not be the most effective for a
given area. In their study, Cutter and Emrich (2006); compared different Orleans Parishes, in
Louisiana, impacted by flooding during Hurricane Katrina. Using the SoVI, they were able to
see the many differences between the different parishes and their abilities to respond and
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recovery after Hurricane Katrina. The primary factors of social vulnerability in these particular
parishes are race, gender, and class. Interestingly though, two other factors were found to play a
role, economic vitality, which showed that this area which relies heavily on agricultural business
becomes more vulnerable since there is no alternative for revenue and employment (Cutter and
Emrich 2006). The other important factor was debt/revenue ratio. This study demonstrated that
social vulnerability can vary from area to area.

1.5 Evacuations
One effective way to save lives in the event of tropical cyclone storm surge; is to leave
the area vulnerable to flooding. Many factors influence whether or not a person will choose to
evacuate a particular area, including physical factors, social factors, or psychological factors. It
can sometimes be difficult to study people’s behaviors during evacuation situation because like
Baker (1979, 1991) and Lindell et al. (2005) mention, evacuees will change their plans as time
progresses during a major hazardous event. The other shortcoming when studying evacuation
can occur because of the potential for memory decay which can limit the accuracy of the data
collected after the event (Stallings 2002). An early study by Baker (1991) documented the
results of surveys conducted after hurricanes that took place from 1961-1989 in locations
spanning from the coasts of Texas all the way around to the coasts of Maine, to better understand
evacuation behavior. His research was an attempt to create a generic model of evacuation that
can be used to predict evacuation behavior for any given hazardous event, not just hurricanes.
His research found that people’s reactions to evacuations is a difficult concept to
precisely measure. However, the information gathered from three decades of hurricane
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evacuations did show common trends, especially regarding factors like, risk area, types of
housing, storm threat information, previous hurricane experience, length of residence in
hurricane prone area, unnecessary evacuations in the past. He did note that demographic factors,
like race and gender, did not play a vital role in evacuation decisions (Baker 1991).
A more recent study by Lazo et al. (2015), sought to analyze people’s decisions to
evacuate based on two information conditions; seeing a hurricane forecast versus receiving an
evacuation order. They surveyed residents in two different coastal areas, those in the MiamiDade area of Florida and those in Houston-Galveston area in Texas. Choosing two different
areas prone to Hurricane impact, added more information about how factors affecting evacuation
decisions can vary across areas. The analysis of the study included many factors that could
influence decisions such as, cultural worldviews, past experiences, risk perceptions. The study
showed people who evacuated because of a forecast they saw on television or online were more
self-motivated not mentioning the need to protect family or pets, and the people who evacuated
because of an evacuation order said they did so to protect their family or pets. This study is
important because it demonstrates protective actions do influence evacuation decisions. There
were a few differences between the two states, which would indicate that differences in culture,
experience, and vulnerabilities play a role in evacuation decision making. The study wraps up
discussing the importance of having clear, developed evacuation plans and the importance of
clearing up any misperceptions about risk and vulnerability (Lazo et al. 2015).
Another study that discusses people’s risk perceptions was done by Demuth et al. (2015).
For this study, information was gathered from people to understand how past experiences with
hurricanes influence their decisions to evacuate for future hurricanes. As stated in earlier
research, past experiences can shape the way a person understands risks, and thus how they will
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respond to future risks (Weinstein 1989). Also focusing their attention on the Miami Dade area
in Florida, this study analyzed residents’ past hurricane experiences and the impact on
evacuation by examining several aspects including, evacuation, property or financial loss,
emotional impact, and overall severity of all impacts. What their research showed is that people
did report emotional impacts, even when they did not experience any tangible losses like
property. These negative effects; heightened residents’ decision to evacuate for the next hazard.
Understanding the intangible experiences people have (those not directly related to property
damage or injuries) could help provide better understanding to how and why people make
decisions when faced with hazard risks. For example, people who did evacuate and incurred
property damage (tangible experience) said they were less likely to evacuate the next time
because they believed they could better protect their property. Thus, showing that past
evacuations may deter people from future evacuations.
In the case of Hurricane Ike, discussed earlier, more than 100,000 residents along the
Gulf coast of Texas refused to evacuate when urged. The most common reason people gave for
not evacuating was they did not want to be stuck in traffic trying to leave, which was exasperated
by the traffic issues that occurred during Hurricane Rita in 2005 when citizens of coastal Texas
were asked to evacuate (Pappas 2011). When the 22 ft. storm surge inundated most of the coast
after Ike made landfall, close to 2,000 people had to be rescued from the flooding, many even
rescued during the storm (Arrillaga et al. 2008). Unfortunately, when storm surge causes this
level of flooding, emergency crews cannot easily access the area and must rely on other methods
like using boats or helicopters to rescue the residents who stayed behind, which takes more time
and resources. Even these methods can be hampered by the amount of debris in the water. After
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the flood waters have receded, it can still be difficult for emergency crews to get to people.
Figure 19 shows the amount of debris blocking Highway 146 in Seabrook, TX.

Figure 19. Debris along Highway 146 from Hurricane Ike (National Geographic)
Seventy-four deaths in Texas alone were attributed to Hurricane Ike whether directly or
indirectly (Zane 2008). More than 100,000 homes were flooded and many towns directly on the
coast were completed destroyed leaving hundreds of thousands homeless. A study following
Hurricane Ike, by Morss and Hayden (2010), demonstrated how people obtain, interpret and use
hurricane forecasts and warnings can influence their decisions to evacuate. For their study, 49
residents who were affected by Ike along the Texas coast, were interviewed 5 weeks after
landfall to discuss their perceptions of risk and their decisions to evacuate. The residents
interviewed; stated they did not think the Saffir Simpson scale did an adequate job conveying the
risk Ike posed. This indicates that people perceived there would not be much damage with a
category 2 storm, since it is lower on the scale. The interviews also uncovered the variety of
sources people used to determine their personal risks and make protective decisions. One
important finding from the study is the fact that many of the interviewees had prepared their
homes from strong winds, but did not take any precautions against flooding, which proved to be
the more destructive force. Ike was a devastating example of what can happen when people
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refuse to leave their homes during a mandatory evacuation. In another study that researched
people’s perception of the meteorological hazards of a hurricane, the results showed that overall
storm surge was perceived as the highest risk (Brommer 2010). Interestingly though, this survey
focused on residents of the New Orleans areas as they were evacuating for Hurricane Gustav in
2008, just three years after Hurricane Katrina.
Technology and especially social media has become a valuable tool in researching how
people behave in hazardous situations like hurricanes. Seeing the thoughts and reactions of
people as they are happening has become an important research tool in analyzing how people
react to and use information. A study by Morss et al. (2017) developed a better understanding of
the role social media can play in risk communications, conceptualizing hazards, and evacuation
decisions. An analysis of Twitter during Hurricane Sandy showed how people use social media
platforms to understand, interpret, and pass on storm information. Figure 20 shows the number
of Hurricane Sandy related tweets per hour in Rockaway, NY, before, during, and after. The
analysis is important because the use of social media platforms is widely used to distribute
information, including storm hazards and could impact evacuation decisions.
Though social media can be quite helpful, there is a risk of false information being spread
to large amounts of people. False information can cause unnecessary panic. An example of false
information was when people used their social media to share stories before Hurricane Irma,
about the storm becoming a category 6, which obviously does not exist with the current SaffirSimpson Scale (Snyder 2017). This type of false information spreads very rapidly on a platform
like social media. It is very important that people are getting correct facts, from legitimate
sources during times of emergency.
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Figure 20. Hurricane Sandy related Tweets (Morss et. al., 2017)

Two recent studies about evacuation decisions by Collins et al. (2017,2018) provided
further understanding into the factors that influence people’s decisions about evacuation. Both
studies focused on evacuees and non-evacuees on the coasts of Florida. Both studies distributed
surveys to analyze how social connections can affect evacuation behavior. The information
gathered from the surveys was used to examine social connections using three dimensions,
dependability, density, and diversity.. The first storm where these methods were utilized was
Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Once the data from the survey were analyzed the study showed that
the person’s perceived dependability of social connections significantly impacted their decisions
to evacuate or not (Collins et al. 2017). In the case of Hurricane Matthew, those who did not
evacuate showed to have more dependable relationships, so they felt more comfortable staying
within their community. Density and diversity of the social connections did not significantly
influence the decision. The next evacuation scenario to be studied was during Hurricane Irma in
2017. Unlike Hurricane Matthew, Hurricane Irma’s data showed that density and diversity
33

played a more significant role in people’s decisions to evacuate and dependability did not
significantly impact the decision (Collins et al. 2018). The differences that may have impacted
these studies is the difference in the area in the cone of uncertainty, recent storms (Irma came
very soon after the devastation caused by Hurricane Harvey) and perceived threat of the storm.
.
1.5.1 Past Evacuations in Florida
Florida citizens are no strangers to evacuation procedures, but unfortunately evacuations
do not always run smoothly. The most recent example of a massive mandatory evacuation order
was in September 2017 in preparation for Hurricane Irma. Hurricane Irma, a category 5
hurricane, was initially projected to make landfall along the southeast coast of Florida, near
Miami. The citizens of Dade and surrounding counties were quick to heed Governor Rick
Scott’s evacuation order especially since recollections from Hurricane Andrew, the last category
5 hurricane to strike almost the same area, were still in the minds of many residents. Mandatory
evacuations were ordered for Zones A-C on September 7th. Zone A includes all areas that could
be affected by an 11ft storm surge and all areas with mobile homes. Zone B includes areas that
could be affected by a 15ft storm surge, and Zone Care areas that could be affected by a 20ft
storm surge. This created the largest evacuation ever attempted by this area. A projected 650,000
people were instructed to leave their home and ride out the storm in safer areas (Douglas 2017).
Figure 21 is an image taken from google maps, via mobile phone, showing the traffic along the
interstates as people flee Miami, the Keys and other parts of southern Florida on September 7th
(Google Maps). A couple days later, residents from the west coast would join the evacuees, as
the storm shifted more to the west. In total, around 6.5 million residents of Florida
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were under mandatory or voluntary evacuation orders, making it the largest evacuations ever
ordered in the United States (Pinellas County, FL 2017).

Figure 21. Traffic prior to Hurricane Irma (Christianne Pearce, Google Maps)

With the orders for evacuations, there is always a risk of stranding motorists stuck on
interstates and highways due to the high volume of evacuees on the road. To avoid this issue,
evacuation orders are issued early to allow people the time to arrive to their destination. The
mayor of Miami also suggested to people fleeing to find a local shelter instead of leaving the
county or state to avoid clogging the roads. To ease some of the issues with evacuations,
Governor Scott lifted the tolls from major highways and advised people to use the shoulder to
allow more options for evacuation (Mak 2017). Figure 22 displays the north bound traffic along
interstate 75 on September 6th. Resources were running low at gas stations and grocery stores, as
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more and more people either decided to ride out the storm in their homes or evacuate from the
threatened area.

Figure 22. Traffic heading north on I-75 (Christianne Pearce)

Even with measures taken to avoid gridlock, the issues with massive evacuations in
Florida became clear. Gas stations were quickly running out of gas, traffic accidents were
frequent, restaurants and stores along the interstate were running out of supplies. To make
matters worse, the path for Hurricane Irma shifted and took aim at the west coast of Florida. On
September 8th, the first of the mandatory evacuations for the west coast began, adding another
300,000 people to the interstates for escape (Smith 2017). The massive size of Hurricane Irma
influenced people’s decision on where to evacuate to, and most headed north towards Georgia,
unfortunately, so did Hurricane Irma. Figure 23 shows the final storm track for Hurricane Irma.
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Figure 23. Actual path of Hurricane Irma (NHC)

The issues concerning the interstates prior to the storm, returned once the storm moved
through. Urgent to return to their homes to check for damage, the millions of residents would
have to make their way back into Florida. Unfortunately, supplies and gas remained depleted,
with the gridlock in the southbound lanes of the interstates now, making supply deliveries to
areas in need very difficult.
The uncertainty in the storm’s path may have caused more evacuations than necessary,
but it also demonstrated the amount of people willing to evacuate. The data surrounding these
evacuations is still underway, but like this research, may provide a better insight who evacuates
and why. It will also provide better data on how to handle large scale evacuations in the future.
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CHAPTER TWO:
RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1 Problem Statement
The problem addressed in this study is the vulnerability of Pinellas County in the event of worstcase storm surge scenarios associated with hurricanes and people’s decisions to evacuate. This
problem is important because according to some of the studies about a worst-case scenario storm
surge impact (Weisberg and Zheng 2006; Lin and Emanuel 2016) a majority of Pinellas county
will be flooded, which would affect a large percent of the population of Pinellas county.
Unfortunately, people’s decisions to evacuate during Hurricane Irma may have impacted their
future decisions to evacuate. This study will use a mixed methods approach to explore the areas
that could be impacted by storm surge and evacuation decisions of the residents in these
vulnerable areas. Failure to evacuate could lead to major casualties in a major storm surge event.
2.2 Objectives and Research Questions
This project attempted to address several research questions concerning storm surge and
evacuation methods in Pinellas County. These are:
•

Who are the population in Pinellas County that could be affected by a worst-case storm
surge scenario as mentioned in previous research?
- How many people could be affected?
- What are the demographics of people who could be affected?
- To what extent might the demographics influence the number of people who
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would evacuate?
•

For Hurricane Irma, did people under a mandatory evacuation follow the orders to
evacuate and why?
-

What factors influenced people’s decisions to evacuate or not (social, physical,
economic etc…)?

•

What are the main issues people in vulnerable areas faced when trying to evacuate for
Hurricane Irma?
-

Will these issues affect people’s decisions to evacuate in the future?

•

Do people perceive storm surge to be a risk?

•

Does the risk of storm surge flooding impact people’s decisions to evacuate?

2.3 Study Area
Pinellas County is a peninsula surrounded by the Gulf of Mexico and Tampa Bay,
making this area vulnerable to storm surge and flooding. This area is a popular tourist destination
due to the miles of white sandy beaches, countless water activities, and a multitude of beach
front hotels. It is also a popular area for retirees from the northern states to settle down and
escape the snow. Pinellas County is very diverse in regards to demographics. There are areas of
extreme poverty adjacent to areas of extreme wealth. Mobile home parks are as prevalent as
multi-million dollar mansions. There are hospitals, waste treatment plants, schools, emergency
operation facilities, numerous marinas, multiple recreation areas, an airport, and more critical
areas that would all be susceptible to storm surge flooding.
Pinellas County has many areas just at or barely above sea level, making most of the
county very vulnerable to storm surge associated with a hurricane. At 970,637 people, Pinellas
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County is the 6th most populous county in Florida, (Census, 2010). It is important to understand
what is at stake when it comes to storm surge damage, especially since this area of Florida has
not had a direct hit by a hurricane in almost one hundred years. For the first part of this study,
the focus was on the areas identified, by a worst-case scenario model, similar to the ones
researched by Weisberg and Zheng (2006) and Lin and Emanuel (2016), to be the most
vulnerable to storm surge during hurricane events and the different demographics that lie in these
areas. To have a better understanding of how people react and handle evacuations, and to
determine how their future decisions might be impacted by past decisions, residents in the
vulnerable areas identified were surveyed. Figure 24 shows the Pinellas County evacuation zones
and from a first glance it is clear to see that much of the county is in some sort of an evacuation
zone.
Figure 25 shows the different emergency management operations sites. Those
represented include, fire stations, and police stations. From this image it is clear which are in
danger of being affected by storm surge, which could result in less availability in the case of
emergencies after the storm due to flooding, debris, or damage to the facility.
Figure 26 shows the location of all the private and public schools, including charter
schools around Pinellas county, many could potentially be impacted by storm surge. This would
disrupt the school year and contribute to the amount of money needed to rebuild or repair those
learning facilities affected.
Figure 27 shows all the medical buildings including assisted living facilities for the
elderly. Figure 28 shows the location of the abundance of mobile home parks distributed across
the county, many in zones that would be affected by storm surge. Evacuation routes are
represented in red in figure 29.
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Figure 24. Pinellas County Evacuation Zones 2018 (Pinellas County Emergency Management)
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Figure 25. Emergency management systems represented (GIS)
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Figure 26. Pinellas County Schools (GIS)
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Figure 27. Pinellas county Medical Buildings
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Figure 28. Mobile home parks in Pinellas county
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Figure 29. Evacuation Routes in Pinellas County
Important infrastructure all throughout Pinellas County lies in areas that could potentially
be affected by storm surge caused by a hurricane. Even the evacuation routes could be dangerous
to cross once conditions deteriorate, and the amount of people from other counties also
evacuating adds to the traffic, making it very important to heed evacuation decisions at the start
of an emergency. Waiting till the last minute, or even during the storm would be hazardous and
many

paths

may

already

be

damaged
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2.4 Data and Methods
2.4.1 Vulnerability Data Collection
To understand the areas in Pinellas County that are geophysically and socially vulnerable,
a combination of GIS, Social Vulnerability Index, and Census Tracts were analyzed. The social
vulnerability index was used to determine socially vulnerable areas in Pinellas county. The
complete Pinellas County social vulnerability index created by the CDC is shown in figure 30.
The darker blue areas on the map below indicate the areas found to be the most vulnerable
overall including variables like socio-economic data, housing composition, ethnicity and
transportation. Figure 31 breaks down the four categories to individually show what areas are
most vulnerable in those aspects.

Figure 30. Social Vulnerability of Pinellas County (CDC)
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Figure 31. Breakdown of Social Vulnerability in Pinellas County (CDC)
Below is a GIS map created to show where these areas determined to be socially
vulnerable intersect those areas in evacuation zones. This shows where the socially vulnerable
and geophysically vulnerable overlap. The social vulnerability index is represented by the
varying shades of blue as shown above, and the evacuation zones are represented by colors
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purple, green, yellow, orange and red. With red being evacuation zone A, those first to evacuate.
The social vulnerability index was made transparent to show where the vulnerabilities were both
represented and the areas that had social vulnerabilities and were also in an evacuation zone are
represented by the maroon polygons in figure 32.
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Figure 32. Overlay of social vulnerabilities and geophysical vulnerabilities (GIS)
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2.4.2 Survey Data Collection
These areas determined to be both socially and geophysically vulnerable were the target
locations for the distribution of the survey instrument (see appendix A). The survey consisted of
23 items and several components including, household socio-demographics, resource
assessment, and past and future evacuation decisions. The survey was distributed in public areas
known to have abundant foot traffic. These included major shopping centers like Target, Publix,
and Walmart. Three separate locations were used as distribution sites to make the surveys more
random and to increase the sample size. The surveys were administered over two days with three
teams, consisting of graduate and undergraduate students from the University of South Florida
summer Research Experience for Undergraduates Program, surveying in three different
locations.
The areas selected for the surveys are represented as squares labeled 1, 2 and 3 in the
evacuation zone map (Figure 33). Square 1 is in the East Clearwater area, square 2 is in the St.
Petersburg area, and square 3 is Pinellas Park. The red areas represent zone A, orange zone B,
and yellow zone C. These locations were chosen due to their proximity to an A, B, or C
evacuation zone. Students conducting the survey approached any Pinellas County residents,
willing to take the time to answer the survey questions, which generally took about ten minutes
to complete. To participate in the survey, the person had to be a resident of Pinellas county
during the time of Hurricane Irma and had to be over the age of 18. During the process, many
residents who lived through the experience of Hurricane Irma, were very willing to share their
stories and experiences, even though the surveys were distributed nine months after impact. To
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avoid issues with literacy, our surveyors read the survey to the participant and marked the survey
tool for them.
To address the research questions regarding evacuation, the survey included categorical and
short answer questions addressing their evacuation decisions for Hurricane Irma, including
reasons why they chose to evacuate or not. A Likert scale measure was included to rate what
information sources they relied on the most to make their evacuation decisions. Questions were
included to determine if peoples’ future evacuation decisions have been affected by Hurricane
Irma. A Likert scale was included for residents to rate how the various threats during a hurricane
influenced their decision to evacuate. The inclusion of this question will help determine if people
perceive storm surge as a major threat during a hurricane

1

2
3

Figure 33. Areas chosen for evacuation surveys (Pinellas County Emergency Management)
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2.4.3 Statistical Data
Once the surveys were coded and cleaned, multiple analyses of the data were performed
using the statistical program SPSS version 25. To find if any significance association exists
between two variables, such as different demographics and evacuation decision, or evacuation
decisions past and future, or storm surge if storm surge has an influence on evacuation decisions,
a Pearson’s Chi- Square test was performed.
The data for the study were provided from the 234 surveys that were completed. Residents
could choose not to answer questions, so some variables were left blank leading to some missing
data points. The different demographics represented by those who participated in the survey is as
follows. Of those surveyed, 31.2 percent were male, and 67.7 percent were female. The average
age of responders was 45 years old. Many different ethnicities were represented, with the
majority, 70 percent being white. Out of the residents surveyed, 26.9 percent reported someone
in the household having a disability. Of those surveyed, 40 percent had a college degree. Others
had some college or a high school diploma. The average annual household income was $40,00049,999. The average length of time of residency in Florida was 26.5 years.
The demographics of Pinellas County provided by the US Census Bureau shows the county
having 52% females, 82% are white, 9.8% have a member of the household with a disability, 30
% have at least a bachelor’s degree, and the median household income is $48,968 (US Census
2010).
Even with three different locations chosen for the survey distribution many people from
multiple zip codes participated. Table 1 shows the distribution and frequency of different zip
codes. Figure 34 shows a map of the different zip codes and their locations in Pinellas County
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along with the evacuation zones represented by the colors red, yellow, orange and green. The
five zip codes that were most abundant are outlined in light blue and shows that all of them are in
an area that has a possibility of flooding.
Table 1. Count of zip codes represented by survey participants

Figure 34. Counties with highest number of participants in survey
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CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS
Using a simulation similar to the worst-case scenarios discussed by Weisburg and Zheng
and Lin and Emanuel, a SLOSH map was created. The map created, figure 35, shows a
simulation of what the storm surge for a category 5 hurricane moving north at 10 mph over
Pinellas county during high tide would be like. The blue flags show the tide levels in feet. It can
be seen that most of Pinellas County experiences minimal to extreme flooding, with only those
areas well above sea-level remaining dry.

Figure 35. SLOSH model of category 5 hurricane (SLOSH)
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The three cities used for the survey, Clearwater, Pinellas Park, and St. Petersburg would
all experience flooding. The populations for these cities respectively; 107,685, 49,079, and 244,
769. That’s a total of 401,533 residents that live in these three cities, 43 percent of Pinellas
County’s population. The residents not in the storm surge zones, would also be impacted, due to
road closures and would find themselves cut off from resources and emergency help.
3.1 Demographics
A total of 234 residents participated in the survey. Of those 234, 145 or 62% made the
decision to stay home or in their local area within the same evacuation zone, only 64 residents or
27.4% decided to leave the area and 25 residents or 10.7% chose to go to a shelter. To answer
the question if demographics affected resident’s decisions to evacuate of not, a Chi-Square
analysis using SPSS 25 was created comparing evacuation decision to demographic information.
First, table 2, comparing gender and evacuation status was created. Table 2 shows the ChiSquare test results. According to the tests, gender, education level, and annual household income
did have a significant association with evacuation status.
Table 2. Chi-Squared analysis on evacuation status and demographic status
Variables

Chi-Squared Value

Evacuation status & Gender

10.267

Significance between
variables (p-value)
.036

Evacuation status &
Ethnicity
Evacuation status &
Education
Evacuation status & Annual
Household Income

9.672

.289

15.250

.018

28.542

.027
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In terms of percentages, table 3 shows 98 out of the 157 or 62.4% of women surveyed
chose to stay home or their local area. Of the men surveyed, 44 out of 73 or 60.3% chose to stay
home or in local area. The percentage of women who chose to evacuate was 30.6% and 21.9%
of men decided to leave the area.
Table 4 shows the comparison of ethnicity with evacuation decision. The majority of all
the ethnicities represented made the decision to stay home or in their local area. However, there
was no significance between the ethnicity of the resident and their decision to evacuate. The
ethnicities represented included, white residents, 97 out of 164 or 59.1%, African American
residents, 30 out of 39, or 76.9%, Latino’s 9 out of 13 or 69%, Asian Pacific Islander, 3 out of 7
or 42.9%, and other 4 out of 8 or 50%. Whites did have the highest percentage of residents leave
the area compared to the other ethnicities, however it is acknowledged that the numbers of some
other ethnicities in this study are lower
Table 3. Evacuation status vs gender
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Table 4. Evacuation status vs ethnicity

Highest education level was another demographic determined by the survey. The results
are shown in table 5. Of the 65 with a high school diploma or GED, 40, or 61.5% decided to stay
home or in local area. Likewise, those with some college and those with college degrees who
decided to stay home or local area, were 65.1% and 63.8% respectively. The percentages for
those deciding to evacuate were high school diploma/GED, 21.5%, those with some college,
23.1%, and those with a college degree 32.2% Again, according to the Chi-Squared test, there
was a significance between education level and evacuation decision.
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Table 5. Evacuation decision vs highest education level

The last demographic determined by the survey was annual household income. From
table 6, the majority of almost all income brackets chose to stay home or in their local area. Most
people, regardless of income decided to ride out the storm in their own houses or at a friend or
family’s house nearby, but there was a significance according to the Chi-Squared analysis
between annual household income and evacuation decision.
Table 6. Evacuation status vs annual household income
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According to these residents interviewed for this survey, some of the demographic
variables like gender, education level and annual household income did have a significant
association to their evacuation decisions.
3.2 Evacuation Decisions
The decision to evacuate can be a difficult decision to make. Mandatory evacuations do
not ensure that everyone evacuates who should, as many people still decide to remain in their
homes. With the SLOSH scenario created for this study, the residents in all types of evacuation
zones would experience flooding of some degree. Deciding to stay in their homes could cost
them their lives. Table 7 shows the comparison of evacuation types with the evacuation
decisions. The chart shows that only 41 of the 92 residents in the mandatory evacuation zone left
the area and 16 out of the 92 went to a shelter outside of the evacuation zone. Only 18 of the 97
residents in the voluntary evacuation zones left the area and 6 of the 97 went to a local shelter
outside of the evacuation zone. Even though mandatory evacuations are called, many people in
this case, preferred their own homes regardless of the dangers instead of trying to leave the area.
Table 7. Evacuation status vs evacuation zone type (SPSS)
Evacuation Zone Type
Mandatory
Evacuation Status Shelter outside evac zone

Voluntary

None

Don't Know

Total

16

6

0

3

25

Home or Local Area

35

73

29

5

142

Left area

41

18

2

3

64

92

97

31

11

231

Total

To understand what affected evacuation decisions for these residents, different questions
were asked. One of the first sections of the survey included a Likert scale to rate how much the
resident relied on different forms of media to inform their decision, with 0=not relied on at all
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and 4=relied on the most. The results are displayed in Table 8. The most relied on source for
evacuation decisions was the local media, or local news stations, followed by national media.
The least relied on source was print media followed by radio broadcasts.

Table 8. Role of Media on Evacuation Decision (SPSS)
Local Media

Electronic Media

Print Media

Radio Broadcasts

Gov't Officials

55
42
10

10
19

30

33
36
41

33
29

33
11

26

15

17
24
28
31

26
4

26
18

60

82

87

109

122

160

177

National Media

NOT RELIED ON AT RELIED ON ONLY A
ALL
LITTLE

RELIED ON

RELIED ON A LOT

MOST RELIED ON

A Chi-Squared analysis was also performed comparing the evacuation status to the type
of media to see if there was a significant association between the two. Table 9 shows the results
of each of the tests. The p-values for all of the variable comparisons except, government officials
were greater than .05, indicating the only significant association between media and evacuation
status for this group of residents was government officials.
After determining what types of media, the residents were more likely to follow, what
type of social relationships affected evacuation decisions was also determined with a Likert scale
with the same type of rating. The results in Table 10 shows that the residents participating in this
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survey did not rely heavily on any relationships to make their decisions according to the
percentages.
Table 9. Evacuation status and media sources Chi-Square analysis
Variables

Chi-Squared Value

Significance between
variables (p-value)

Evacuation status &

7.986

.435

4.778

.781

8.747

.364

7.692

.464

7.162

.519

15.846

.045

National media
Evacuation status & local
media
Evacuation status &
electronic media
Evacuation status & print
media
Evacuation status & radio
broadcasts
Evacuation status &
government officials

Table 10. Role of relationships on evacuation decision
Family far away

Neighbors

Friends Nearby

Friends far away

129

NOT RELIED ON AT
ALL

RELIED ON A
LITTLE

61

RELIED ON A LOT

40
21

39

43

41
23

29

34

RELIED ON

23

20

23

21

19

23
13

23

18

18

39

56

89

102

117

154

Family Nearby

RELIED ON MOST

A Chi-Squared analysis was also completed on each of the relationship variables
compared to evacuation status to see if there was any significance (p<.05). Table 11 shows the
results from this analysis. From this analysis, no significant association exists between the
evacuation status of these residents and their social connections.
Table 11. Evacuation status and social relationships Chi-Squared analysis
Variables

Chi-Squared Value

Significance between
variables (p<.05)

Evacuation status & family

6.747

.564

11.521

.174

5.088

.748

8.515

.385

5.604

.691

nearby
Evacuation status & family
far away
Evacuation status &
neighbors
Evacuation status & friends
nearby
Evacuation status & friends
far away

Residents who participated in the survey were also asked if there were any other reasons
why they decided to evacuate or stay at home or in their local area. Some of the reasons for
evacuating included; worried about damage, living on the bottom floor of apartments, wanting to
avoid power outages, and keeping family safe. Reasons for not evacuating included; did not live
in an evacuation zone, felt like their structure would be safe, did not want to leave pets, and did
not believe the storm would be that bad.
To determine if their decision to evacuate for Hurricane Irma will impact their future
decisions to evacuate for other major hurricanes threatening to impact Pinellas County, a Chi
Square test was run using their evacuation status for Irma and the decision to evacuate for the
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next major hurricane as the variables. Table 12 shows the results from the Chi- squared test and
based on these results, it can be stated that there was a significant association between evacuating
for Hurricane Irma and evacuating in the future (Χ2(1) = 16.63, p < .0001). Surprisingly, even
with the trials and tribulations people faced during the evacuation process for Hurricane Irma,
this survey showed that most people would evacuate for the next major hurricane. Luckily, with
the dangers of storm surge during a hurricane, evacuation is the best way to save lives. If this
survey is any indication of how others in Pinellas County feel, they will leave the area, instead of
risking being stranded due to storm surge, or risking their lives.
Table 12. Evacuation status vs evacuation decision for next hurricane

The actual number of residents from this study who would evacuate for the next major
storm are shown in the table 13. Though the majority of these residents answered that they would
evacuate for the next hurricane, 36.3% still said no. If we applied that percentage to the entire
population of Pinellas county, that would be just under 300,000 residents that would stay behind
and risk being in danger of storm surge. The reasons why they would choose to evacuate are
included in table 14. The survey participants were able to choose from flooding, wind damage,
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safety issues, power outages, and they were able to add in any other reasons why they would
evacuate. The other reasons people gave included; avoiding damage to car, food and water
shortages, living on ground level of buildings, and keeping family members safe.
Table 13. Percentages of evacuation decisions (SPSS)
Frequency
Valid

Missing

Percent

No

85

36.3

Yes

145

62.0

Total

230

98.3

4

1.7

234

100.0

999

Total

Table 14. Reasons why residents will evacuate for next hurricane (SPSS)
Flooding

Wind Damage

Safety Issues

Power Outages

7%
21%

23%

23%

26%
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Other

The residents who decided to stay home instead of evacuating were also asked to choose
reasons why, including transportation, pets, family members, disabilities, damage to house,
looting, finances, and the option to add in any other reasons. The results are represented in the
table 15. According to the graph, the highest percentage of people said they would stay home
because of their pets, which means these residents were not aware that many shelters allowed
pets. Better communication about shelters could save lives. Some of the other reasons included,
being through many hurricanes where nothing happened, it’s more fun to stay home since it’s
like camping, money issues, and house is well prepared.
Table 15. Reasons why residents will not evacuate for next major hurricane (SPSS)
Transportation

Pets

Family Members

Disabilities

Damage to house

Looting

Finances

Other

6%

13%

14%

20%
15%

14%

12%
6%

The final part of the survey was for the resident to add any other comments about their
evacuation experience during Hurricane Irma and the following are some of the quotes taken
straight from the surveys.
“First storm to actually scare me, since it was at first a category 5”
“Brutal, but did not lose power.”
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“Didn’t leave mainly because of work, preparing for future storms now, buying a generator.”
“Evacuate! Safe, better than sorry.”
“Good response after the storm.”
“Hurricane centers could have done a better job, shelters giving mixed signals.”
“It was horrible, house fire caused after the storm from power pole falling on house.”
“People need to pay attention to the news, and young people need watch news more.”
“Power nightmare, 9 days without power, no ice, no gas.”
“Shelters need to provide better food, need more reliable generators, need better sleeping
arrangements, terrible experience at shelter, lack of transportation so had to bike there, because
I don’t have a car.”
3.3 Storm Surge Perceptions
To determine if people perceive storm surge to be a threat and if it has any influence on
their evacuation decisions, a section of the survey addressed this question. This section included
a Likert scale where they could rate how each type of storm threat, influenced their decisions
0=not influenced at all and 4=influenced the most. The different threats of the storm included
storm surge flooding, strong wind, flooding from rain, size of storm, and tornadoes. The tables
(16-20) below show the results for this section of the survey.
The percentages represented in the graphs above show that size of storm and strong
winds influenced residents’ decisions the most, much like in the study by Senkbeil et.al. (2018).
In regard to storm surge, people were split with 30% not influenced at all and 31% influenced the
most. According to these responses, storm surge does not seem to have much influence on
evacuation decisions. To show there was no significance between storm surge threat and
evacuation decision a chi square test was run on the two variable and the results below show
there was no significance between the two Χ2(1) = 14.661, p >.05). Unfortunately, as in the case
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of Hurricane Ike in 2008, if people decide to only evacuate for the size of a storm or the strength
of wind, they could still experience devastating storm surge and risk losing their life.
Table 16. Influence of storm surge on evacuation decision

Table 17. Influence of strong winds on evacuation decision
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Table 18. Influence of flooding from rain on evacuation decision

Table 19. Influence of size of storm on evacuation decision
Size of Storm Influence

Size of Storm Influence
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Table 20. Influence of tornadoes on evacuation decision
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Storm surge from hurricanes is one of the most devastating natural disasters. The role storm
surge plays in devastation is not always understood by the residents in the path of a hurricane.
Deciding to not evacuate for a hurricane because it is not a category 4 or 5 could lead to
fatalities. Evacuating for a storm can be a stressful, fearful event that many people rather not take
part in. If they do evacuate for a storm and their area is spared by the storm this could lead to the
decision to stay in their home or local area for the next storm that threatens. This study used the
case of Pinellas County, an area of Florida both geophysically and socially vulnerable to storm
surge, after Hurricane Irma to determine what factors played a role in the decision to evacuate, if
their decision to evacuate or not for Hurricane Irma would affect their decision to evacuate for
future storms, and if they perceived storm surge to be a major issue with hurricanes.
What this study found some demographic variables like gender, education level, and annual
household income did have a significance in the evacuation decision. The only type of media to
have a significant impact was government officials, and social relationships did not show any
significance when making the evacuation decisions. This study also revealed that many people
did not evacuate for Hurricane Irma, even under mandatory evacuation orders. However, when
asked if they would evacuate for the next storm, majority of those surveyed said they would
evacuate for the next hurricane. After running a Chi-Squared analysis, it was determined that the
residents’ decision to evacuate for Hurricane Irma was significantly associated to their decision
to evaluate for the next hurricane. When sharing their stories at the end of the survey, many
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people described the power outages were terrible, and many lacked resources during this time.
People who did go to local shelters, were not happy with the conditions there. After a frightful
2017 and 2018 hurricane season where people all around the nation watched as Hurricane Maria
in 2017 caused massive destruction to Puerto Rico, and then in 2018 Hurricane Michael barreled
through the peninsula of Florida as a very powerful category 4 storm leaving little more than
remnants in its wake, it is understandable that people have a stronger sense of urgency to leave a
threatened area.
Flooding due to storm surge was found to not have a significant influence on people’s
decisions to evacuate, instead wind speed and size of storm were more influential. Unfortunately,
if scenarios like those modeled by studies like Weisberg and Zhang or Lin and Manuel or the one
created in SLOSH for this study, were ever to become reality, many people would suffer from
the impacts of storm surge.
Some of the limitations of this study would be the small sample size. Having only 234
participants may not have adequately represented the population of Pinellas County. Another
limitation would be length of time between the actual event and the survey. Memory decay
(Stallings 2002) could have caused the participants to remember the situation differently than
what actually transpired which could affect how they answered survey questions. With the
surveyors in control of the survey, the participant may have not been entirely truthful with
certain answers due to embarrassment. Missing data due to non-responses could have also
affected the data. The rejection rate was moderately high at 40%.
This research will add to the literature on evacuation decisions, in particular for those
residents who live in geophysically and socially vulnerable areas. Understanding what influences
evacuation decisions can save lives. This research could also be used to help decision makers in
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other areas of similar vulnerabilities.

Further research into better communication during

emergency situations would be beneficial for this area of Florida, since some of the residents
discussed not knowing if shelters would accept pets or which ones were even open or available.
Performing a similar study after a longer period of inactivity would determine if these residents
in vulnerable areas would still choose evacuation for the next storm or with a major hurricane as
a distance memory would choose to stay in the comfort of their own home. Other studies could
discuss the economic impact storm surge from a hurricane would have in Pinellas County, or the
other hazards that this area could face in the event of a major hurricane making landfall.
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Appendix A:
Hurricane Evacuation Decision Making and Risk Perception Survey
Hello, my name is _______ and I’m part of a research team from the University of South
Florida in Tampa. We are conducting a survey of Florida Residents about their hurricane
experiences. Your answers will be kept completely confidential. That means we will never
reveal your personal identity, but instead will report all information gathered in group form. You
are under no obligation to participate in the survey and may stop answering questions at any
time.
WERE YOU LIVING IN PINELLAS COUNTY AT THE TIME OF HURRICANE IRMA IN 2017? (If YES, continue. If
NO – state the survey is only for Pinellas County residents, thank you)
1. Would you like to continue with the survey?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No

(If YES, continue. If NO, stop and thank individual, then RECORD THE NO RESPONSE of those 18
or older).
2. What is your age? ____________
under 18 (DO NOT CONTINUE THE SURVEY, only participants 18 or older)

The first set of questions are about your previous evacuation experiences with hurricanes. By
evacuation we mean, leaving the geographic area that was threatened by the storm. This
does NOT include staying in a local shelter still in the storm area.
3. With regards to Hurricane Irma in 2017, did your household
[ ] Go to a shelter outside of evacuation zone
[ ] Stay at home or in your local area
[ ] Leave the area threatened by Hurricane Irma, but did not go to a shelter
4. Did your household leave the area threatened by any hurricanes between 2004 and 2016?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] DK
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5. Not counting Hurricane Irma, what was the LAST hurricane you remember evacuating for?
____________________________
The next set of questions are about your hurricane evacuation decision.
6. When did you decide to evacuate or not for Hurricane Irma e.g. Day of, or 2 days before?
______________
7. What is the City and Zip you were at when you made your decision to evacuate or not?
CITY: _____________
ZIP:_____________

8. Have you moved since Hurricane Irma?
[ ] No
[ ] Yes, new City: __________________ Zip:_________________
9. On a scale of 0-4, with 0 being Not relied on at all & 4 being relied on the MOST, please rate
the following hurricane information sources on how much you RELIED on it in your decision
to stay or go.
NOT relied
on at all

Relied on
only a little

Relied
on
2

Relied
on a
lot
3

MOST
relied
on
4

National Media
(e.g. Weather Channel, CNN, etc.)
Local Media
(e,g, Local news or cable shows)
Electronic Media
(e.g. Internet news and weather
websites)
LIST websites used most:

0

1

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Print Media
(e.g. Newspapers)
Radio broadcasts
(e.g. AM, FM, Satellite)
Government Officials (e.g.
Emergency managers, elected
officials, etc)
Family nearby you
(within 50 miles away)

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4
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Family a distance from you
(50 or more miles away)
Neighbors

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Friends nearby you
(less than 50 miles away)

0

1

2

3

4

Friends a distance from you
(50 or more miles away)
Social networking (e.g. facebook,
twitter)
Other (specify):

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

10. If you left the threatened area with Hurricane Irma, did anyone in your household evacuate
with you and why? ________________________
11. If you did not leave the threatened area with Hurricane Irma, did anyone in your household
stay with you and why? ________________________
12. Did anyone outside your household stay with you or evacuate with you? If so who (i.e. what
relationship do they have to you: relation (what?), neighbor etc)? ________________________
13. If you have pets, did that influence your decision to evacuate or not? ___________
14. Which evacuation zone were you living in at the time of Irma?
[ ] Zone A
[ ] Zone B
[ ] Zone C
[ ] Zone D
[ ] Zone E
[ ] None
[ ] Don’t know
15. Which type of evacuation zone were you living in at the time of Irma?
[ ] Mandatory
[ ] Voluntary
[ ] None
[ ] Don’t Know
16. If you were in an area that received an evacuation order did you follow that order?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
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17. What do you understand ‘Hurricane Warning’ to mean? Choose one answer.
A hurricane could possibly impact the area in 24 hours or less
A hurricane is expected to impact an area in the next 36 hours.
The anticipated onset of tropical-storm-force winds are expected within 36
hours.
Don’t Know
18. Please rate the following questions regarding your friends and family on a scale of 1-4,
where 1 is strongly disagree and 4 is strongly agree.
Strongly

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Most of my friends know each other

1

2

3

4

My good friends also know my family members

1

2

3

4

My neighbors come to my parties

1

2

3

4

I send my neighbors holiday cards

1

2

3

4

At work, I meet completely different people than during
leisure time
I do not easily ask for help when I need it

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

I can’t expect my neighbors to help me with serious
problems
I can’t expect my colleagues to help me with serious
problems
Before I trust someone, I have to be sure of his/her

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

intentions

19. Please rate how the following influenced your decision to evacuate or not for Hurricane Irma.
0 didn’t influence at all, 4 influenced most.

Flooding from storm surge
Strong winds
Flooding from rain

NOT
influenced
me at all
0
0
0

Influenced
only a little
1
1
1
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Influenced Influenced MOST
a lot
Influenced
me
2
3
4
2
3
4
2
3
4

Size of Storm
Tornadoes

0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

Social factors such as being
with family
Other. Please state.

0

1

2

3

4

20. Had Pinellas County received a direct hit, here is what could have happened. (Show visual
of the storm surge impact to the current location).
Would you have made the same decisions?
[ ] No, because ___________________________________________________________
[ ] Yes, because ___________________________________________________________

21. Will you choose to evacuate the next time there is a major hurricane forecasted to impact
your area?
[ ] YES
[ ] NO
If no, why? Check all that apply:
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

] Transportation issues
] Pets
] Family members
] Disabilities
] Risk of damage to house
] Risk of looting
] Finances
] Other reasons:___________________________________________________________

If yes, why? Check all that apply:
[
[
[
[
[

] House may flood
] Wind damage may occur
] Safety
] Power outage issues
] Other reasons: __________________________________________________________

22. These couple of questions will help us gather some demographic information for the
study. Again, please remember that this information will remain confidential and will not be
linked back to you.
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Does anyone in Hshold
have a disability?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

How long have you lived
in FL?

_____ weeks

_____ months

Have you ever lived in
another state that was
impacted by hurricanes?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

If so, how long were you
there?

HOW LONG?
__________________

Gender

[ ] Male

[ ]Female

Ethnicity

[ ] African
American

[ ] Latino

[ ] White

_____ years

[ ] Asian/Pacific
Islander
[ ] Other (specify)

Education
(highest
completed)

[ ] < HS grad

[ ] HS
Grad/GED

[ ] Some College

[ ] College degree
(specify)

Annual
Household
Income

[ ] < $20k

[ ] $30k-$39,999

[ ] $50k- $59.999

[ ] $70 - $79,999

[ ] $20k - $29,999

[ ] $40k-$49,999

[ ] $60k-$69,999

[ ] $80k - >

23. Is there anything else you would like to tell us about your Hurricane Irma experience?

Thank you for your time!
Data Collector Initials: _____________
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Appendix B:
List of Figures and Images Fair use Arguments

Figure 2: Public domain, educational use (www.NOAA.gov)
Figure 3: Public domain, educational use (www.NOAA.gov)
Figure 4: Public domain, educational use (www.usgs.gov)
Figure 5: Public domain, educational use (www.NOAA.gov)
Figure 6: Public domain, educational use (www.NOAA.gov)
Figure 7: Public domain, educational use (state of Florida archives)
Figure 8: Public domain, educational use (FEMA.gov)
Figure 9: Public domain, educational use (FEMA.gov)
Figure 10: Public domain, educational use (SLOSH.org)
Figure 11: Educational use, research
Figure 12: Public domain, educational use (NOAA.gov)
Figure 13: Public domain, educational use (National Geographic)
Figure 14: Public domain, educational use (National Geographic)
Figure 15: Public domain, educational use (NOAA.gov)
Figure 16: Educational use, research
Figure 17: Educational use, research
Figure 18: Public domain, research
Figure 19: Public domain, educational use (National Geographic)
Figure 20: Educational use, research
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Figure 23: Public domain, educational use (NHC.gov)
Figure 24: Public domain, educational use (Pinellas.gov)
Figure 30: Public domain, educational use (CDC.gov)
Figure 31: Public domain, educational use (CDC.gov)
Figure 33: Public domain, educational use (Pinellas County)
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Appendix C
IRB Document

August 26, 2016
Jennifer Collins, PhD
School of Geosciences
4202 E Fowler Ave
NES 107
Tampa, FL 33620
RE: Exempt Certification
IRB#: Pro00027740
Title: Evacuation Behavior Measured at Time of Expected Hurricane Landfall: An Assessment
of the Effects of Social Networks
Dear Dr. Collins:
On 8/26/2016, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria
for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b):
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement),
survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless:
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified,
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human
subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or
civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in
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the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.
Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the application is
closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that was previously
declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation
of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not
warrant an amendment or new application.

Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does not
limit your ability to conduct your research project.

We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have
any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,
Kristen Salomon, Ph.D., Vice Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board
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